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Abstract Heating buildings contributes to approximately 36 % of Europe’s energy
demand and several EU member states have adopted mandatory energy labels to improve
energy efficiency by promoting home weatherization investments. This paper focuses on the
perception of the energy label for residential buildings in the Netherlands and the role of
different frames (egoistic, biospheric and social norms and neutral frames) in motivating
adoption of energy labels for housing. We used a behavioral email experiment and an online
survey to investigate these motivational factors. We find that biospheric frames are weaker
than the other three motivational frames in terms of engaging interest in the energy label, but
that the biospheric frame results in higher willingness to pay (WTP) for the energy label. We
also find that age (rather than income) correlates with higher WTP for home energy labels.
Keywords Building energy efficiency  Energy conservation  Energy efficiency 
(Residential) energy label  Motivating conservation behavior  Motivational (message)
framing  Social norms  The Netherlands
1 Introduction
While attention to both global and local environmental problems has been increasing,
peoples’ actions do not always reflect these improvements in environmental awareness and
per capita energy consumption is still on the rise (Steg 2008). In Europe, heating buildings
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is the source of 36 % of CO2 emissions (Agentschap NL, 2011). Heating and cooling
buildings contribute to two major environmental problems, i.e. resource depletion and
climate change. Energy conservation is a critical component of the EU’s plan to curtail
emissions (by at least 20 % by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, see Agentschap NL, 2011;
Europa 2015). Residential buildings are especially relevant for saving energy in Europe
since 60 % of the estimated energy savings potential for buildings comes from private
homes (IDEAL EPBD 2011).
Promoting conservation through energy efficient buildings is an obvious way of
addressing this issue. However, many individuals do not know how efficient their building
is and what they can do to maximize their home’s conservation potential. Energy labels are
an important information/market instrument that can help promote awareness on the
current level of buildings’ energy efficiency, indicate ways to improve efficiency and
create explicit value for energy savings (Banerjee and Solomon 2003; Truffer et al.
2001). The residential energy label program is similar to that of energy labels for appli-
ances (e.g. washing machines and refrigerators). The label gives a score between A(??)
and G (A?? meaning a highly energy-efficient home and G a highly inefficient home).
Unlike the appliance energy label, the residential label also provides information on how to
improve energy efficiency and thereby the label score (e.g. conservation behaviors such as
insulating a house). The goal of the program is twofold: (1) provide information on the
building’s current energy efficiency and (2) suggest potential measures to improve effi-
ciency and promote energy conservation. Residents benefit by having better insight into
their homes’ energy efficiency and what they can do about improving it. Improved effi-
ciency can enhance their comfort level and reduce their spending on energy. Also, as
awareness of energy efficiency and energy costs increase, a better label can improve the
property’s market value as well as provide buyers and renters a better indication of how
efficient the building is (Brounen and Kok 2011a, b).
New knowledge (e.g. in the form of energy labeling) can help change attitudes, promote
energy savings and influence consumers’ demand for housing by considering such infor-
mation (Steg and Vlek 2009; Stern et al. 1987; Abrahamse et al. 2007). However, new
knowledge does not always ensure behavioral changes in terms of energy conservation
(Abrahamse et al. 2007). People tend to be reluctant to adjust their behavior when sacri-
fices are needed (e.g. initial monetary/inconvenience costs). Furthermore, consumers may
not be able to accurately assess the short-term investment costs and discomfort against the
long-term benefits (Griskevicius et al. 2010; Steg 2008).
The energy label for residential buildings is not widely used in practice although
consumers could benefit from more energy efficient homes. Sixty-five percent of Dutch
homes were built before 1980 and these buildings are 50 % less efficient than homes built
in the last 10 years (Brounen et al. 2012). Furthermore, approximately 5 % of the Dutch
household budget is spent on heating and electricity (CBS 2009). In 2009, average costs
per household for gas (heating) ranged from €1200 to €2800 annually depending on the
level of heating efficiency (Brounen and Kok 2011a; Brounen et al. 2012). The Nether-
lands pays the fourth highest amount for gas (heating) per kWh in Europe (EEP 2013).
Moreover, lower income households budget a proportionally higher part of their income
for energy costs (CBS 2009; Brounen and Kok 2011a). Nonetheless, the energy label has
met considerable resistance and lack of interest in the Netherlands.
The opposition to the label in the Netherlands is attributed to unclear and lenient policy,
negative media attention and distrust (Brounen and Kok 2011a). First, the label was
officially voluntary until January 1, 2013. Lack of incentives for adopting a label and
absence of label enforcement meant consumers could and still can easily avoid getting the
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label (Murphy and Meijer 2011). Second, unclear policy goals and unsatisfactory imple-
mentation led to critical reports from several real estate experts (e.g. the Dutch Association
of Realtors, the Homeowners Association and the Renters Association) (Brounen and Kok
2011a). For example, the methodology of calculating the score was not standardized,
leading to different label ratings for the same house. The consumer advocacy TV program,
Radar, investigated and exposed these problems (see Radar 2007, 2008). The industry’s
lack of support coupled with negative media attention contributed to lowering consumer
confidence in the label; the decreasing label adoption rate (while in 2008 25 % of houses
sold had a label, this fell to 15 % after the airing of Radar) demonstrates some distrust in
the energy label (Brounen and Kok 2011a).
Since January 2015, some changes have been made to the residential energy label
program. All houses receive a provisional label based on the year it was built, the surface
area and building type. However, as with the old system, the label is mandatory only when
selling or renting houses and is valid for 10 years. Failing to provide the label entails the
risk of being fined up to €405 (Rijksoverheid 2015). However, people have the opportunity
to get the label up until the last minute to avoid the fine, which limits potential buyers’ and
renters’ access to information. To get the definite label, individuals fill in an online form,
which is remotely assessed by professionals (Rijksoverheid 2015). No one comes to inspect
the house, which can affect the label’s credibility as information can be intentionally or
unintentionally misrepresented or inaccurate. Majcen et al. (2013a) conclude that thorough
in-person inspections are needed if the label is to correctly represent residential buildings’
energy efficiency; moreover, accurate calculations are difficult to obtain when inspection is
not conducted in a thorough manner. For example, even slight changes in insulation
estimates (U-value) result in very different demand levels and energy label calculations.
The current changes to the energy label program do not incorporate these insights.
Past research has assessed the role of the energy label as a tool for conservation.
Murphy and Meijer (2011) and Murphy et al. (2012) analyzed the energy label in the
Netherlands; their findings suggest that the label has failed to reach the policy measure’s
target group and resulted in minimal emissions reductions. Majcen et al.’s (2013a, b)
research suggests the energy label score can predict gas consumption to a degree, but that
theoretical estimates of energy use in terms of the energy label are not indicative enough
and actual energy consumption averages at each label level should be used instead;
moreover, the finding that a good label does not necessarily mean lower energy con-
sumption reflects the findings of similar studies (e.g. Backhaus et al. 2011). On a more
positive note, Brounen and Kok (2011a, b) utilized information from real estate and energy
label databases to show that homes with a good label (C or higher) have a shorter selling
time (on average 24 days shorter) and a higher selling price (approximately 3 % more)
than comparable houses with a red label (i.e. after taking into account differences in
location, quality and year of construction). They also discovered that a better energy label
score (e.g. A) does correlate with a lower average monthly gas costs for comparable
houses, but that most people are neither interested nor aware of their energy consumption
(with young high-income individuals having the lowest awareness levels) (Brounen et al.
2011). Thus, many households are unaware of how their household could conserve energy
by having a better label score. Moreover, the Energy Center of the Netherlands (ECN)
performed an EU-wide household analysis of consumer motivation and barriers related to
the energy label. Their findings suggest that how the message for the label is framed (what
motivational incentive and context are used as well as understandability) is as crucial as
what kind of information is provided (Backhaus et al. 2011). For example, they find that
people are particularly concerned about presentation and comfort when renovating their
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home. People are also more likely to adopt energy saving suggestions during renovations
when these are presented in a comprehensible manner. They suggest exploring how to
present the label as an avenue for further research.
Peoples’ interests relate to the persistent question of how to motivate households to get a
label and lower their energy consumption. Griskevicius et al. (2008) find that economists and
policymakers often rely on costly financial incentives or developing expensive campaigns in
order to mitigate climate change. In the Netherlands, governmental information campaigns
‘‘assume that people are persuaded more by arguments based on egoistic considerations’’ and
design their campaigns to appeal to this type of audience (De Groot and Steg 2009, p. 64). De
Groot and Steg (2009, p. 64) further claim that ‘‘these campaigns often fail to promote
sustainable behavior’’ because they do not appeal to other values and potentially cheaper and
more effective methods could be used to entice pro-environmental behavior. For example,
Griskevicius et al. (2008) and Cialdini and Schultz (2004) claim that social norms are an
underused tool for promoting climate change abatement and decreasing energy consumption.
Our paper extends the current literature by making use of a behavioral email experiment
and online survey to assess the role of different motivational frames (egoistic/self-interest,
biospheric/environmental, social norms and neutral/information only) in stimulating
behavioral change and, in particular, adoption of energy labels for conservation. Fur-
thermore, this is the first study to our knowledge that explores consumers’ perceived value
of an energy label through their willingness to pay (WTP) estimates and links this with
their underlying socio-economic characteristics.
2 Theoretical framework
As energy labels try to solve an environmental problem, the assumption is that one needs to
point out environmental values to motivate individuals to get labels in order to conserve
more energy. However, the situation is often more complex in reality. Improving the
effectiveness of information tools is linked to understanding and tapping into the right
motivational frame of consumers (Steg and Vlek 2009). For this reason, the behavioral
influence of available information (e.g. in terms of encouraging energy efficiency) is likely
to be mediated by the way such information is framed (see Tangari and Smith 2012).
Furthermore, evidence on environmental behavior also points to the fact that, although
people may claim to care about the environment in general, they are often inconsistent in
terms of their actual environmental behavior; for example, Steg and Vlek (2009) found
that, in the Netherlands, even if people actively recycle or eat less meat, they do not
necessarily conserve more energy than the average person. Thus, environmental messages
may not necessarily motivate adoption of energy labels.
This research was inspired by the social normative research led by Cialdini et al. (1990)
(see also Cialdini and Schultz 2004; Cialdini et al. 2006; Goldstein et al. 2008; Griskevicius
et al. 2008; Nolan et al. 2008) that employed different motivational frames to see what
framing would elicit the highest response to an environmental problem. For example, in one
experiment the researchers left California residents door hangers with different motivational
frames (biospheric, egoistic, social norms, social responsibility and neutral (information
only) framing) to encourage individuals to use fans instead of air-conditioning (Cialdini and
Schultz 2004). In this experiment, as well as other ones which use motivational frames to
encourage towel and linen reuse (Goldstein et al. 2008), these researchers found that social
norms were an effective (and non-costly) frame to encourage pro-environmental behavior.
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Due to the ongoing problem of active energy label adoption, we wanted to research whether
social norms or other motivational frames were more effective in eliciting a response from
Dutch residents to get an energy label. In our case, an email was sent to participants about
the energy label (framed in four different ways) querying their interest in receiving an
energy label. Four motivating frames we explore in this study are (1) egoistic motivations,
(2) biospheric (environmental) concerns, (3) social norms and (4) neutral framing. Our
research uses these frames to analyze which message(s) motivate(s) interest in the energy
label in an online behavioral experiment. A separate online survey is used to understand the
consumers’ profile, WTP and their perception of the energy label as well as environmental
problems. Egoistic motivations relate to self-enhancement values (that place focus primarily
on self and self-oriented goals); these are explained by the theory of planned behavior that
claims behavior is guided primarily by one’s attitude and personal goals balanced with
perceptions on behavioral consequences and social norms, which do not necessarily need to
contradict one’s personal aspirations (Ajzen 1991; Abrahamse and Steg 2009; Bamberg and
Mo¨ser 2007; Steg and Vlek 2009). When egoistic motivations are prominent, the literature
advocates making green products cheaper and more efficient, as well as offering financial
incentives, such as subsidies and tax deductions (Griskevicius et al. 2010). Tangari and
Smith (2012) find environmental messages to be more effective when they place emphasis
on anticipated (monetary) benefits in the shorter term. This is because there is often a
negative relationship between self-enhancement values and environmental action, with the
latter often being framed as requiring some sort of sacrifice (Schultz 2001; Corraliza and
Berenguer 2000; Schultz and Zelenzy 2003).
Biospheric values relate to the concern for the present and future well-being of the
environment and biosphere (Schultz and Zelenzy 2003; De Groot and Steg 2010). To
highlight biospheric values, information should make these people aware of the conse-
quences of their actions on the physical and social environment and stress personal
responsibility to act (Griskevicius et al. 2010; Steg and Vlek 2009).
Social norms relate to the belief of what is commonly done by others (e.g. peers, local
community) and the importance of conforming with a certain expected social behavior
(Griskevicius et al. 2010). The focus theory of normative conduct places emphasis on the
ability of social norms to predict and alter human behavior (Cialdini et al. 2006).
According to this theory, social norms relate to individual’s desire to self-identify with a
social group that one’s behavior is being compared to (Griskevicius et al. 2008). When
there is uncertainty (e.g. in terms of the timing and type of energy price shocks and climate
change impacts), individuals tend to look at others to determine how they should act (i.e.
determine what is the ‘socially appropriate’ behavior) (Cialdini et al. 2006).
Similar to the fan versus air-conditioning door hanger experiment (Cialdini and Schultz
2004; Nolan et al. 2008), a neutral (information only) framing is also used in our study—
this is for sake of comparison against the other frames that incorporate a motivational
message (egoistic, biospheric and social norms).
3 Methods
3.1 Participants
For the purposes of conducting our study, we approached 4000 randomly selected clients
of a Dutch utility company in the spring of 2012, 3985 of which actually received the
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online survey. It is unknown how many individuals opened their email. A sub-sample of
3188 were invited to participate in the behavioral email experiment by email. The reason
for excluding part of the sample from the behavioral experiment was to enable comparison
between those who had received information through the behavioral experiment with those
who did not. Sample composition is described in more detail in Sects. 3.2 and 3.3. A sub-
sample of 333 individuals (i.e. response rate 10 %) responded to the email experiment that
preceded the survey (see Sect. 3.2). Our sample for the online survey consists of 611
individuals who agreed to participate (see Sect. 3.3) (i.e. a response rate close to 15 %).
Table 1 illustrates some key characteristics of the survey sample (of 611 respondents)
compared to the general Dutch population.
The energy supplier’s clients are located throughout the Netherlands with diverse living
situations (Fig. 1). The majority of the survey respondents are involved in making deci-
sions about energy in their households (27.1 % were solely responsible, 71.8 % were
jointly responsible). Female participants accounted for 33.5 % of respondents and male
participants 66.5 %. Although the sample was randomly selected, most of the respondents
were homeowners. Information about actual annual gas and electricity consumption was
provided by the utility company and was contrasted against self-reported survey data.
3.2 The behavioral email experiment
The experiment explored the role of different motivational frames (provided in an email
message) in promoting interest in residential energy labels. Participants received one of the
following messages that encouraged energy label adoption: (1) improving the environment
(the biospheric frame), (2) saving money and improving comfort (the egoistic frame), (3)
behaving similarly to other consumers (the social norm frame) and (4) neutral information
about the role of an energy label in conserving energy (see Table 2 for the four email
subject lines used in the experiment). The layout of the 4 emails was similar to the door
hangers in Cialdini’s experiment (e.g. Cialdini and Schultz 2004). For each message,
different framing was applied to motivate lowering energy consumption and to briefly
describe the label’s benefits. To determine if individual were interested in the label based
on the manner it was framed, a weblink was provided where they could sign-up for an
online indication label (which is comparable to an unverified definite label) when it was
available (for more specific information on the messages in Dutch please contact the
corresponding author). A fifth group did not receive a behavioral experiment email and
Table 1 Comparison of survey sample versus Dutch population averages
Sample average Dutch average
Annual gas consumption 1904.6 m3 1600 m3 Milieu Centraal (2012)
1850 m3 CBS (2012a)
Annual electricity consumption 3523.24 kWh 3500 kWh CBS (2012a)
Living situation 13.4 % Renters
86.6 % Homeowners
44.2 % Renters
55.1 % Homeowners
0.7 % Unknown CBS (2012b)
Household size 2.66 2.20 CBS (2015)
Age 41–50 or 4.40 (1–6 scale) 41.10 Central Intelligence Agency (2012)
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were only approached to complete the online survey at the same time as the other four
groups. All five groups approached were of equal size (797 individuals).
To measure individuals’ responses to the different motivational frames, a follow-up link
to sign-up for the online energy label was included in the email for interested recipients. If
the individuals chose to follow the link, they were then asked to confirm their interest
(through a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response) and provide contact information. Only individuals
interested in the label were expected to click on the link. Thus, only ‘yes’ responses were
expected although a few individuals did indicate ‘no’. The behavioral experiment emails
were sent out 6 days before the online survey was released to lower the perception that the
email experiment was directly related to the survey. Only responses to the behavioral
Fig. 1 Sample living conditions (N = 611). Note Some values may not add up to 100 % due to rounding
Table 2 Motivational frames
Motivational frame Email subject title
Egoistic Save money by conserving energy
(Bespaar geld door zuiniger om te gaan met energie)
Biospheric Protect the environment by conserving energy
(Bescherm het milieu door energie te besparen)
Social norms Join your neighbors in conserving energy
(Vergelijk uw energieverbruik met uw buren)
Neutral information Energy conservation
(Energiebesparing)
Dutch text in parentheses
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experiment emails received before the survey was launched were included in the analysis.
Responding to the email experiment was not a prerequisite for filling in the subsequent
online survey.
3.3 The online survey and regression analysis
The online survey asked respondents to identify the factors that motivate them to consider
an energy label. The questionnaire was paired with actual energy consumption data in
order to contrast individuals’ actual and desired energy behavior. The questionnaire was
designed to collect information on: (1) self-identified motivational factors behind energy
label adoption; (2) socio-demographic characteristics of respondents; and (3) consumers’
perceived monetary value or WTP for the label. Several questions aimed to capture the
extent of egoistic, biospheric and social normative concerns across respondents as well as
their trust in the energy label and local/government institutions as a source of information.
Participants were probed on their perceived level of responsibility towards (1) resource
depletion, (2) climate change and (3) general environmental problems, as well as their
perceived level of energy efficiency. For several questions, we used a five (or seven) point
Likert scale to measure the level of agreement with a given statement (see Albaum 1997).
For example, respondents were questioned on the importance they attach to increasing their
property value or lowering costs when deciding on energy efficiency on a 1–5 Likert scale
(with larger values corresponding to higher importance). Appendix Table 6 provides a
description of all variables, the scale at which they were measured, as well as references to
the original studies that motivated us to include them in our analysis—for all variables we
have adopted the same, or very similar, Likert scale as the ones used in these original
studies. Respondents were also asked about their perceived WTP for an energy label. As
customary in the literature, a payment card with 22 optional values (between 0 and more
than €1000) accompanied the WTP question (based on Rowe et al. 1996, which assumes
that people’s ability to perceive differences decreases as the value increases). However,
individuals were not constrained by this range and could opt for any possible positive
value.
To explain the variation in WTP across respondents and its association with several
respondent (and housing) specific characteristics, we performed a multivariate regression
analysis estimating 10 different specifications varying the set of explanatory variables (see
Table 4). The first specification only included socio-demographic variables (column 1).
While keeping the socio-demographic variables in the analysis, we consecutively included
in our empirical specification: building and tenancy characteristics (column 2), past and
future renovation plans (column 3), perceived social responsibility for environmental
problems (column 4), perceived ability to improve energy efficiency (column 5), perceived
negative side-effects of energy conservation (column 6), perceived positive side-effects of
energy conservation (column 7), trust (column 8) and a combination of all factors used for
the regression analysis (column 9). In column 10 we only included explanatory variables
that were found to be statistically significant in at least one of the first eight specifications
tested. Regression analysis is a common statistical technique used to estimate the rela-
tionship between a dependent variable (WTP in this case) and a set of explanatory factors.
The estimated coefficient for each explanatory variable corresponds to the predicted
change in WTP for each one-unit difference in this particular explanatory variable (as-
suming that all other explanatory variables of the model are held constant). There is a
detailed description of all of the variables in Appendix Table 6 and their descriptive
statistics in Table 7.
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4 Results
4.1 Behavioral email experiment
A total of 317 energy consumers stated that ‘yes’ they were interest in receiving an energy
label (from the sample of 3188 clients emailed; i.e. the four different message groups of
797 individuals each). The neutral frame received more positive responses (102) than any
other category. The social norms frame had the second highest response rate (84), which
was significantly higher compared to the biospheric framed message (and slightly higher
than the egoistic framed message). A Pearson Chi square test [c2 (3, N = 3188) = 15.96
p = .00] signified that these differences across the four motivational frames are statisti-
cally significant. Summary results are presented in Table 3. This is in line with earlier
research stressing that neutrally framed messages are often more persuasive compared to
messages that convey some form of obligation (see Kolyesnikova et al. 2011). Although
social norms did not score the highest, the relative high response attributed to the social
norm messages is consistent with earlier research by Goldstein et al. (2008). We also
examined statistical differences in the positive response (‘yes’ reply to get energy label)
across pairs of motivational frames. The statistical significance of the difference in the
response rate is the highest for the neutral information and biospheric groups, followed by
the biospheric and social norms.
4.2 The online survey and regression analysis
Our results (based on the primary data collected from the online survey) indicate that the
average participant has a stronger than neutral feeling of responsibility for environmental
problems [i.e. the average value for the level of responsibility for environmental problems is
3.66 in a 1 (no responsibility) to 5 (full responsibility) scale], see correlation table in
Appendix Table 8. However, no significant correlation is detected between the perceived
level of environmental responsibility and the actual gas consumption level. The results also
illustrate that individuals have low expectations with respect to the energy label’s added
value. Most individuals (53 %) stated that they would only get a label if it were mandatory,
Table 3 Email experiment (responses)
Email groups and intent to get an energy label Energy label No. email recipients
No Yes
Group
Egoistic
(self-interest)
Count 4 76 797
Biospheric
(environment)
Count 7 55 797
Social norms Count 5 84 797
Neutral information Count 0 102 797
Total Count 16 317 3188
Value Degrees of freedom Asymptotic significance
Pearson Chi square 15.96 3 0.00
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while few individuals (\35 %) cited the usefulness of getting a residential energy label to
save energy.
On average, the participants’ perceived value of an energy label is low. The average
respondent’s WTP for an energy label (for the 526 consumers, out of the 611 surveyed,
who answered this particular question and, hence, provided the estimates) is €74.11 (more
than 70 % lower than the average market price before 2015, approximately €200). Figure 2
displays the cumulative distribution of the sample in terms of stated WTP. Only approx-
imately 8 % of the respondents are willing to pay the current average market price for an
energy label. Almost 40 % of the sample is not willing to pay more than €25, while
approximately 29 % of the sample opted for a zero value (i.e. no WTP).
The regression results of Table 4 indicate that age was the only socio-demographic factor
that was consistently a significant predictor of WTP (a quadratic specification of age was also
tested but was found to be statistically insignificant). Thus, the older people are, the more
willing they are to invest in an energy label. This is in line with earlier evidence from the
literature suggesting that older individuals often tend to be more interested in energy con-
servation (Brounen et al. 2011). We included the attribute renters and homeowners in the
WTP regressions, but the results showed little difference between the two groups. This result
should be interpreted with caution due to the small sample size of renters who participated in
the survey. For this reason, this attribute was not analyzed separately in the WTP regression
analysis. In the Netherlands, many individuals rent long-term, often through social housing
corporations. Given their long-term occupancy, it is perhaps not surprising that their
behavior can resemble the behavior of actual owners (e.g. installing floors and maintenance).
As one would expect, those who are occupying more recently built properties have a
lower WTP, but the correlation is not statistically significant. Surprisingly, how long
Fig. 2 Percentage of respondents willing to pay a given price for the label
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individuals plan to stay in the same home (planned occupancy duration) is negatively
correlated with WTP (despite the fact that longer occupancy can provide an opportunity for
higher accumulated benefits as a result of energy conservation; see Table 4 columns 2, 8, 9
and 10). However, this negative correlation can be attributed to the policy in place in the
Netherlands of only requiring a residential energy label when buying, selling or renting a
house. Many renters are unaware whether their residence has a label and what the label
score is. Neither the perceived nor actual gas consumption is statistically significant in
explaining the variation in WTP (although higher energy consumption is associated with a
higher WTP). Having neighbors who financed an important renovation of their house in the
previous year (costing more than €1000) appears to be a motivating factor behind adopting
an energy label (columns 3 and 9). There is ample evidence in the literature pointing to the
role of social connectivity (and particularly learning from neighbors) in diffusion of certain
practices and technologies (e.g. Goldstein et al. 2008; Manski 2000).
As expected, the degree of importance attached to energy savings correlates positively
[although weakly for specifications (4), (8) and (9)] with the WTP level for an energy label
(see Table 4). In terms of assuming responsibility for the environment, only a sense of
responsibility for minimizing GHGs significantly explains WTP for energy labels (columns
4 and 10). The perceived ability to contribute to energy conservation as well as the
motivating factors related to either negative or positive side-effects of energy label
adoption appear to have weak statistical power in explaining WTP levels. In other words,
respondents do not strongly associate a residential energy label with specific energy
conservation goals they might wish to pursue (see columns 5–7). On the other hand, trust in
environmental organizations and the energy label as sources of information for energy
conservation is positively associated with increased WTP (by €11.86 and €14.23 respec-
tively; see column 8). This is in line with empirical work pointing to a close relationship
between self-efficacy (own ability to reach goals) and trust in institutions (e.g. there is
much evidence suggesting that trust in information renders individuals more proactive and
raises the rate of adoption of certain technologies—e.g. see Lee and Lin (2009) and
Be´langer and Carter (2008) for the role of trust in influencing behavior and technology
adoption in medicine and the IT sector. Blake (1999) also claims that lack of trust is often
one of the key barriers behind limited pro-environmental behavior.
We also tested whether the WTP for an energy label varies significantly across the five
different groups: i.e. the four groups who received the differently framed messages of the
email experiment, as well as the fifth group that only participated at the online survey (see
Table 5). There was a significant effect at the p\ .10 level of the different message
framing on WTP [F(4, 521) = 2.20, p = .068]. The group that received the biospheric
message expressed the highest WTP (€105.38), while the group that received the egoistic
Table 5 Comparison of average WTP across five groups
Group Mean N Std. deviation
Egoistic 60.11 108 108.38
Biospheric 105.38 93 166.50
Social norms 74.34 94 123.06
Neutral information 65.96 116 85.44
Group not participating in the email experiment 69.99 115 100.45
Total 74.11 526 118.14
ANOVA [F(4, 521) = 2.20, p = .068]
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message expressed the lowest average WTP (€60.11). Hence, while messages with a
biospheric motivation triggered the lower response rates in our email experiment, those
who received them expressed the highest average WTP levels for residential energy labels.
Both the groups that received the egoistic and neutral message types have lower average
WTP than the group that did not receive the email experiment.
5 Discussion
The study sets out to assess the role of different factors in motivating energy conservation
through energy labels. First, we demonstrate that how a message is framed can affect the
response rate. In our email experiment, neutral information performed the best in pro-
moting interest in the residential energy label. This suggests that the neutral framing of the
message may improve the credibility of energy labels, particularly considering their
negative past publicity. Nonetheless, social norms can still play a role in motivating people
to get an energy label given their relatively high response rate and WTP. At the same time,
although the goal is to promote environmental outcomes, this study indicates that Dutch
households are the least motivated, in terms of response rate, to get a label when the
biospheric frame is applied. The egotistic frame, traditionally used in Dutch governmental
information campaigns (De Groot and Steg 2009), had a relatively low response rate along
with the lowest WTP. The findings suggest that policymakers need to consider alternative
approaches to the traditional egotistic framing or exclusive dependence on biospheric
framing in order to increase response levels.
The study’s findings suggest that, in general, the response rate to a message framing is
not indicative of the WTP level (i.e. a higher response rate does not mean a higher WTP).
The results indicate that those who received neutral framed or social norms based mes-
sages (compared to biospheric ones) had the highest response rates but not the highest
WTP. The group that received the biospheric message expressed the highest WTP
(€105.38), while the group that received the egoistic message expressed the lowest average
WTP (€60.11), but had a relatively low response rate. Different groups have different
average WTP, but of course label providers offer clients a uniform price—this suggests
that the success of the energy label initiative would require appropriately framed messages
in combination with a pricing scheme (of sufficiently low rates) that takes into consider-
ation the differences in WTP across groups/messages.
A socio-demographic factor contributing to high WTP is age. These results are in line
with those obtained by Brounen et al.’s (2011) that young (and high-income) individuals
have the lowest awareness levels of energy consumption. Making energy conservation
more meaningful for young people is an important issue for future research. Policymakers
should realize that younger energy consumers have both lower awareness and are more
resistant to paying for an energy label.
We observe a high level of resistance to paying for an energy label, as indicated by the
28.7 % of respondents who opted for a zero WTP for a label. As of 2015, the provisional
label is free and the definite label costs ‘a few bucks’ (Rijksoverheid 2015). The changes
made in 2015 are better aligned with peoples’ WTP shown in this study. However,
although the current label has the benefits of low cost, the accuracy and added value of the
information provided are questionable as indicated by previous research (Backhaus et al.
2011; Brounen and Kok 2011a; Majcen et al. 2013a, b). The cheaper price comes at the
expense of not having a personalized inspection of the property’s energy efficiency nor
tailored recommendations.
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A possible explanation for the resistance to pay for the label is that few individuals find the
label useful. Contrary to expectations, the findings suggest that the length of occupancy is
negatively correlated to WTP for an energy label. Many respondents express an interest in
having a label only when mandatory, while few respondents acknowledge any perceived
potential benefits of the label. The current policy focuses on those selling or renting to others.
However, this is not the group that is likely to make improvements to the energy efficiency of
buildings while renovating. Greater efforts are needed to ensure that long-term occupants,
who have the potential to benefit from improved energy efficiency, use the label. Clear
communication of the type of information the energy label provides and the anticipated
benefits of residential energy labels (that accrue to individuals, the natural environment as
well as the society as a whole) could incentivize long-term occupants to use the label.
However, the amended energy label policies still focus on mandatory requirements
(which can be opted out of up until the last moment) instead of improving the label’s
usefulness and matching consumers’ interests with energy conservation. The energy label
program’s goal is to lower emissions through energy conservation. However, unless
individuals are motivated to use the label’s information to improve energy efficiency in the
housing stock, the label remains a window dressing instead of aiding energy conservation.
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Appendix
See Tables 6, 7 and 8.
Table 6 Variables description
WTP Question asked how willing the individual is to pay for an energy label if
it is mandatory and has the purpose of informing the individual of their
house’s energy efficiency and of giving advice on how to improve the
energy efficiency. Values on payment card from €0 to €1000
Gender Discrete: female, male
Age 6-point scale:\20; 21–30; 31–40; 41–50; 50–65; 65?
Size household Number of people in household including respondent
Interval scale: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5?
Income Continuous scale of gross income with option not to answer
€0–1000; €1000–2000; €2000–3000; €3000–4000; €4000–5000; €5000?
Education level Based on the Dutch educations system
12-point scale from lower to higher educational attainment
Planned length of occupancy The number of years the individual plans to remain at the current address
Scale:\2 years; 2–5 years; 6–10 years; 11–15 years; 16–20 years; more
than 20 years; I don’t know
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Table 6 continued
Type of house The type of house the respondent lives in, going from a structure that has
walls with the least amount of exposure to outer climate to the most
Apartment; row house; corner house; duplex; free standing house
Period built Period of house built. Buildings constructed during the same period
generally had the same level of insulation
Discontinuous scale: before 1919; 1919–1945; 1946–1970; 1971–1980;
1981–1990; 1991–2000; after 2000; I don’t know
Perceived gas use Question asked whether the respondent thinks that they consume more or
less gas than the Dutch average of 1600 m3 per year
Likert scale (1–5): much less than average; less than average; average;
more than average; much more than average; I don’t know
Actual gas use Value is respondent’s gas consumption for the past year (m3/a)
Actual electricity use Value is respondent’s electricity consumption for the past year (kWh/a)
Actual label score Only respondents who answered ‘yes’ to whether they had an energy label
were asked this question. The respondent was asked what rating their
house received from the existing label scale of A–G where A denotes an
energy efficient house and G denotes a very inefficient house.
Scale: (1–7, where A = 1, B = 2)
Perceived label score Respondents who answered ‘no’ or ‘maybe’ to whether they had an
energy label were asked this question. Respondent were asked what
rating their house received from the existing label scale of A–G where A
denotes an energy efficient house and G denotes a very inefficient house.
Scale: (1–7, where A = 1, B = 2)
Family renovated Question asked whether a family member financed a renovation for more
than €1000 in the past 12 months. Inspired by Adjei et al. (2012)
Yes; no; I don’t know
Friends renovated Question asked whether a friend financed a renovation for more than
€1000 in the past 12 months. Inspired by Adjei et al. (2012)
Yes; no; I don’t know
Neighbors renovated Question asked whether a friend financed a renovation for more than
€1000 in the past 12 months. Inspired by Adjei et al. (2012)
Yes; no; I don’t know
Respondent plans to renovate Question asked whether the respondent expects to renovate in the next
3 years. Inspired by Adjei et al. (2012)
Yes; no
Feel responsible for resource
depletion
Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees with the
statement that their energy consumption contributes to resource
depletion. Based on research by Abrahamse and Steg (2009; 2011) on
the level of perceived responsibility for environmental problems stating
that attitude and values are important indicators of environmental
conservation
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Feel responsible for GHG Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees with the
statement that their energy consumption contributes to GHG. Based on
research by Abrahamse and Steg (2009, 2011) on the level of perceived
responsibility for environmental problems stating that attitude and
values are important indicators of environmental conservation
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Feel responsible for
environmental problems
Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees with the
statement that their energy consumption contributes to general
environmental problems. Based on research by Abrahamse and Steg
(2009, 2011) on the level of perceived responsibility for environmental
problems stating that attitude and values are important indicators of
environmental conservation
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
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Table 6 continued
Believe energy used efficiently Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees with the
statement that they already efficiently consume energy. Based on
research by Abrahamse and Steg (2009, 2011) on the level of perceived
responsibility for environmental problems stating that attitude and
values are important indicators of environmental conservation and by
Cialdini and Schultz (2004)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Can save 5 % of energy use Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees with the
statement that it would be easy to save 5 % of their household
consumption. Refers to the concept of perceived behavioral control
inspired by research by Abrahamse and Steg (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Can save 20 % of energy use Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees to the statement
that it would be easy to save 20 % of their household consumption.
Refers to the concept of perceived behavioral control, specifically how
capable they feel they are for conserving energy, inspired by research by
Abrahamse and Steg (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Want to save energy in the
future
Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees to the statement
that they want to lower their future energy consumption. Refers to the
concept of perceived behavioral control inspired by research by
Abrahamse and Steg (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
No idea how to save energy Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees to the statement
that they do not know how they could use less energy. Refers to the
concept of perceived behavioral control inspired by research by
Abrahamse and Steg (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Importance of energy savings Inspired by value-belief-norms theory on how values motivate energy
conservation behavior Steg and Vlek (2009), Stern (2000) and work by
Cialdini and Schultz (2004)
Likert scale 1–5: entirely unimportant to completely important
Conservation: is a lot of work Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees to the statement
that energy conservation is a lot of work in order to gauge the
respondent’s perception of energy saving Abrahamse and Steg (2009,
2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Conservation: less
comfortable life
Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees to the statement
that energy conservation means experiencing less living comfort in
order to gauge the respondent’s perception of energy saving Abrahamse
and Steg (2009, 2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Conservation: loss of freedom Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees to the statement
that energy conservation limits personal freedom in order to gauge the
respondent’s perception of energy saving Abrahamse and Steg (2009,
2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Conservation: is time
consuming
Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees to the statement
that energy conservation costs too much time to realize energy savings
in order to gauge the respondent’s perception of energy saving
Abrahamse and Steg (2009, 2011), Cialdini and Schultz (2004)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
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Table 6 continued
Conservation: unnecessary Question asked to what degree the respondent dis/agrees to the statement
that they have already done everything to conserve energy in order to
gauge the respondent’s perception of energy saving Abrahamse and Steg
(2009, 2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely disagree to completely agree
Reason: improve environment Question asked how important is improving the environment to the
individual as a benefit of making their home more energy efficient.
Inspired by personal norm and motivation research by Cialdini and
Schultz (2004) and Su¨tterlin et al. (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely unimportant; unimportant; neutral;
important; very important
Reason: make house more
comfortable
Question asked how important is making their home more comfortable to
the individual as a benefit of making their home more energy efficient.
Inspired by personal norm and motivation research by Cialdini and
Schultz (2004) and Su¨tterlin et al. (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely unimportant; unimportant; neutral;
important; very important
Reason: increase house value Question asked how important is improving the house’s value to the
individual as a benefit of making their home more energy efficient.
Inspired by personal norm and motivation research by Cialdini and
Schultz (2004) and Su¨tterlin et al. (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely unimportant; unimportant; neutral;
important; very important
Reason: lower costs Question asked how important is lowering energy costs to the individual
as a benefit of making their home more energy efficient. Inspired by
personal norm and motivation research by Cialdini and Schultz (2004)
and Su¨tterlin et al. (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely unimportant; unimportant; neutral;
important; very important
Reason: lessen CO2 emissions Question asked how important is lowering CO2 emissions to the
individual as a benefit of making their home more energy efficient.
Inspired by personal norm and motivation research by Cialdini and
Schultz (2004) and Su¨tterlin et al. (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely unimportant; unimportant; neutral;
important; very important
Reason: less sensitive to
price increases (energy)
Question asked how important is being less sensitive to higher energy
prices in the future to the individual as a benefit of making their home
more energy efficient. Inspired by personal norm and motivation
research by Cialdini and Schultz (2004) and Su¨tterlin et al. (2011)
Likert scale 1–5: completely unimportant; unimportant; neutral;
important; very important
Trust environmental groups Question asked how trustworthy the respondent found environmental
groups as a source of information for personal energy consumption.
Based on the survey conducted by ECN Adjei et al. (2012)
Likert scale 1–5: completely untrustworthy to completely trustworthy
Trust energy label Question asked how trustworthy the respondent found the energy label as
a source of information for personal energy consumption. Based on the
survey conducted by ECN (Adjei et al. 2012)
Likert scale 1–5: completely untrustworthy to completely trustworthy
Trust local and national
government
Question asked how trustworthy the respondent found the local and
national government as a source of information for personal energy
consumption. Based on the survey conducted by ECN Adjei et al. (2012)
Likert scale 1–5: Completely untrustworthy to completely trustworthy
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics
Variable Number Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
WTP 526 74.11 0 1000 118.14
Gender 534 1.66 1 2 .473
Age 536 4.40 2 6 1.12
Size household 537 2.66 1 5 1.17
Income 391 4.32 1 6 1.46
Education 523 6.35 1 8 1.75
Planned length of occupancy 486 3.81 1 6 1.67
Type of house 608 3.20 1 5 1.31
Period built 601 3.76 1 7 1.75
Perceived gas use 548 3.19 1 5 1.14
Actual gas use 4000 1904.60 746.49 1001 8142
Actual electricity use 4000 3523.24 1416.46 512 6996
Actual label score 51 3.55 1 7 1.85
Perceived label score 525 3.38 1 7 1.47
Family renovated 492 1.59 1 2 0.49
Friends renovated 446 1.61 1 2 0.49
Neighbors renovated 473 1.65 1 2 0.48
Respondent plans to renovate 589 1.69 1 2 0.46
Feel responsible for resource depletion 580 3.85 1 5 1.10
Feel responsible for GHG 580 3.59 1 5 1.16
Feel responsible for environmental
problems
578 3.66 1 5 1.15
Believe energy used efficiently 580 3.80 1 5 0.88
Can save 5 % of energy use 560 3.83 1 5 1.07
Can save 20 % of energy use 559 2.44 1 5 1.08
Want to save energy in the future 559 3.90 1 5 0.99
No idea how to save energy 558 2.41 1 5 1.16
Degree value energy savings 572 4.38 1 5 0.73
Conservation: is a lot of work 566 2.10 1 5 0.97
Conservation: less comfortable life 567 2.06 1 5 0.97
Conservation: loss of freedom 568 1.95 1 5 0.89
Conservation: is time consuming 566 2.32 1 5 0.95
Conservation: unnecessary 569 2.96 1 5 1.04
Reason: improve environment 560 4.04 1 5 0.73
Reason: make house more comfortable 559 3.87 1 5 0.74
Reason: increase house value 560 3.49 1 5 0.88
Reason: lower costs 559 4.18 1 5 0.65
Reason: lessen CO2 emissions 559 3.93 1 5 0.81
Reason: less sensitive to price increases
(energy)
558 4.06 1 5 0.72
Trust environmental groups 544 3.30 1 5 0.99
Trust energy label 545 3.43 1 5 0.86
Trust local and national government 540 3.40 1 5 0.86
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